Michael, in a comment to an earlier post of mine, wrote:
...some of my major theoretical concerns would be with 1) the lack of critical awareness with regards to global capitalism, and 2) the seeming inability of Wilber’s model to adequately address the contingent nature of current social formations – rather than its supposed teleological necessity – and thereby under-theorizing ‘power’ as such. Civilization could have led (in a very bottom-up way) to the emergence of very different ‘integrations’ and value (memetic) expressions.
These are some excellent points and worth some investigation. Warning: this post is philosophically dense and is aimed at those who are interested in this conversation.
So with that proviso, here goes….
Coincidentally in the last few weeks I've been reading a number of essays by Daniel Gustav Anderson (here for example, Daniel's blog here). Daniel makes many of the same criticisms regarding AQAL integral theory (i.e. Wilber's version of integral theory) and capitalism. Anderson is a historical materalist in the tradition of Louis Althusser.
I particularly appreciate Daniel's reflection here:
However, I will say that the notion that integral culture as such is and has been historically oppositional is not really an accurate representation of my own position. I fear I have simplified it too much. In the micropolitics paper, my position is much more complex: some integral movements are consciously oppositional, some are unconscious or mechanical epiphenomena of political and economic forces & structures, and still others are a mix of both.
For anyone interested in this subject, I recommend his various writings on the subject (though I can't say I agree with everything he's said). For the record, Daniel clearly sees Wilber and various related organs (e.g. Integral Institute) as falling within the "unconscious or mechanical epiphenomena of political and economic forces" tradition of integral.
I think there does definitely need to be more work with a skeptical eye to various forms of global capitalism and the idea of contingent social formation within the integral movement (‘movement’ is a term I’m not entirely comfortable with but used for lack of a better one). I'm in major agreement with Michael on this point. I would nevertheless like to pushback a little against his criticism—or alternatively put—offer a partial defense from within integral philosophy (specifically Wilber's formulation thereof) to these charges.
Before that I want to say briefly say how I understand the term contingent social formation (CSF).
This wiki has something perhaps to offer to our understanding of (CSF):
Social constructionism and social constructivism are sociological theories of knowledge that consider how social phenomena develop in social contexts. Within constructionist thought, a social construction (social construct) is a concept or practice that is the creation (or artifact) of a particular group. When we say that something is socially constructed, we are focusing on its dependence on contingent variables of our social selves.[1] The underlying assumptions on which social constructivism is typically seen to be based are reality, knowledge, and learning.[2]
Social constructs are generally understood to be the by-products of countless human choices rather than laws resulting from divine will or nature. This is not usually taken to imply a radical anti-determinism, however. Social constructionism is usually opposed to essentialism, which defines specific phenomena instead in terms of transhistorical essences independent of conscious beings that determine the categorical structure of reality. [3]
This definition might not get at every point Michael would like to be included in the definition, but I think at least gets us in the ballpark. The key point as I see it there is that contingent social formation (or social construction) is opposed to essentialism. My understanding of Michael’s critique of Wilber is largely a critique of supposed essentialism. If I’m wrong on that point, I’d invite Michael to correct me.
To return then to Michael's comment. I think it's fair to say that his [Michael's] two points above are two ways of saying basically the same thing. Or rather because of the perceived issue of "supposed telelogical necessity" (point #2), it is impossible to offer critical awareness/resistance to global capitalism (point #1).
As I see it then, a great deal in this criticism rests consequently on establishing the notion of AQAL theory's "supposed teleological necessity." I find Daniel's criticisms similarly leaning heavily (if not entirely resting upon) the argument that Wilber has created a teleological necessary system---a determinism of idealist persuasions we might say.
By idealism I mean the specific school of philosophy-metaphysics that argues (simplistically put) that ideas are the driver of causal reality. Reality is mind generated. . Classically idealism is opposed by materialism—the teaching that material forces are the prime mover of reality (again it’s worth noting that Daniel Anderson's position while potentially open to the criticisms leveled against materialism is consistent in its criticisms of Wilber).
There are various forms of materialism--scientific (e.g. biological, genetic determinism), historical (e.g. Marxist thought). Similarly various forms of idealism have been held: from Descartes mind-body dualism to Plato's Forms to Hegel's developmental idealism.
With those two schools of philosophy broadly in mind, I can now begin to answer Michael's comment about the underdeveloped theme of "power" or contingent (versus evolutionarily determined) relations in integral theory, most especially within the realm of global capitalism.
Now the first point to raise comes from Wilber's own meta-reflection on the use of an evolutionary/developmental model.
In his foreword to the New Edition of his book Up From Eden (originally published in 1977), Wilber argues that there are five principles “that can rehabilitate cultural evolution in a sophisticated form…and yet also account for the ups and down of consciousness unfolding (p. xi).”
Those five principles are:
1. The dialectic of progress
2. The distinction between differentiation and dissociation
3. The difference between transcendence and repression
4. The difference between natural and pathological hierarchy
5. Higher structures can be hijacked by lower impulses.
The dialectic of progress means that as development occurs new positive developments are introduced but also new horrors and new potential evils get introduced into the stream of life as well. One always occurs with the other.
Number 2, the distinction between differentiation and dissociation forms the hallmark of much of Wilber’s analysis of modernity and postmodernity. In differentiation, which Wilber sees as a normal and healthy process of development, a being differentiates into its own autonomy—think of the teenager/young adult leaving the family home and moving out on his/her own. Wilber argues that differentiation should be followed by re-integration, but in some (many?) cases may not be. Instead of (in a positive manner) differentiating one morphs into total dissociation and disconnection. In our example of the son/daughter leaving home (good differentiation), imagine a case in which they never end up forming a healthy adult bond with their parents again (negative, dissociation).
Principle #3 is a variation on that theme whereby a more developed reality does not embrace its more foundational elements, but rather represses them. The mind of a young child develops into the recognition of social roles and rules after a period of more egocentric/self-centered form of existence (e.g. the “terrible twos”, which aren’t terrible recall for the two year old but for those who take care of them). Now the development of such mental processing is a major developmental achievement and ideally leads to differentiation followed by (re)integration. But what may occur instead is a child comes to very forcefully (via the mind) repress bodily and emotional being (e.g. budding sexual emotion, self-touching, etc.). The potential (and in certain cases reality) of repressing an earlier developed form, should not be thought to be an indictment of the newly developed form altogether, simply a reminder that (as in point #1), when new goods are achieved, more can go wrong. In this example, it would be wrong to criticize the development of the young person’s mind in total just because the mind can (improperly) repress the earlier emotional body in negative ways.
Principle #4 (natural versus pathological hierarchy) argues that there exists in the study of evolution the principle of natural hierarchy (or holacracy). A molecule enfolds an atom as a cell enfolds a molecule. In contrast, there is pathological hierarchy. An example of which might be (as in principle #3), a higher form repressing its earlier forms of development. Pathological hierarchies in this case are definitionally suicidal or “cutters.”
Another form of pathological hierarchy is the potential for earlier, less developed forms of human organization to hijack (principle #5) more developed technology but used to their own more destructive ends. For example, a pathological and less developed group might (through a political revolution/crisis) take over the organs of a nation-state (a more developed form of human politics) and use that more developed form of the state to earlier and more violent ends. The Taliban taking power in Afghanistan during the 1990s would be a prime example (remembering of course they had outside help).
All of these principles should be kept in mind and work (I believe) as a response to Michael’s concerns with Wilber’s writings.
I’ll excerpt a passage from Wilber (which includes some of his own terminology which I will then help contextualize, but this passage is worth the read, even if all the terms don’t make immediate sense on first read).
As I have tried to document, the modern flatland (MOM) arose in the wake of two major evolutionary developments, one "good" and one "bad." The good news was the Weberian differentiation of the value spheres of art, morals, and science on a widespread, cultural scale (i.e., the differentiation of the Big Three or the four quadrants). The bad news was that, for various complex reasons I analyzed in Sex, Ecology, Spirituality and A Brief History of Everything, that important differentiation of the value spheres went too far into dissociation of the value spheres, which eventually resulted in the Habermasian "colonization of art and morals by science"--that is, the domination of the interior realms of I and We by a scientific materialism of Its: by any other name, the mean orange meme.
The MOM is the global disaster of modernity (as the MGM is the disaster of postmodernity and the MBM was the disaster of medieval premodernity, etc.). I have written extensively on this MOM pathology, which actually underlies all of the other pathologies being criticized (from global captialism to exploitation). As I have tried to make very clear, flatland (MOM) is the single greatest pathology on the planet right now, and has been for three centuries; the other mean memes are still present, and equally insidious in their own fun ways, but by sheer dint of its power and reach, the MOM gets the prize for nastiest of the nasty memes.
Mean Orange Meme simply means a dissociated and repressive, pathological form of modern rationality. In other words, a form of modernism that falls particularly prone to principles 2-4 above: dissociating and not simply differentiating; repressing and not including lower elements; and pathological domination hierarchy instead of holarchy. Moreover that global technological and economic platform (“The World is Flat”) is being deployed to all sorts of values systems, many of them pre-rational (principle #5).
Now there are legitimate criticisms of the use of "mean" in Wilber’s quotation (Chris Cowan on that point here), but the basic notion of a Good/Bad (Healthy/Unhealthy) expression of various levels I think establishes the importance of contingency in social formation (in reply to Michael’s concern).
In Integral Spirituality (2006), Wilber argues that there are four basic reals in existence (truth procedures in Badiou's terminology): Spirit, Art, Morals, and Science. Wilber covers this terrain in greater detail in Chapter 9 of Integral Spirituality for anyone interested on this point.
What Wilber is saying then (within of course the confines of his system), for every stage of development (usually he marks them as 8 currently), the Big Four of Spirit, Morals, Art, and Science are foundational elements of the Kosmos. They are part of his ontology; he calls them judgments or intelligences. They are like four pillars that undergird each new level. The levels expand and the way in which each of The Big Four show up in each level is qualitatively different (and not teleologically pre-determined), but each level always has all four.
So, in a more simplified form, using Wilber’s stages of archaic, magic, mythic, and rational there was a version of Spirit, Art, Morals, and Science at each of those levels. This way of formulating the issue is not common, particularly in relation to Science, though I find it helpful to consider. Modern science is truly modern science, but there were ancient forms of science.
According to Wilber, when Western Europe entered into the rational-modern stage, what we term The Enlightenment (itself a contingent enterprise), The West (contingently) chose to deny Spirit as a truth procedure, thereby repressing Spirit and sending Spirit underground, only to have it re-surface in the truth procedure of Science, creating a spiritually-charged Science (now scientism as an ideology). According to Wilber, this modern spiritually- supercharged Science proceeded to take over (“colonize”) the realms of Arts and Morals, leaving what Wilber terms flatland (or really scientistic-land). The world became dominated by the ideology of the market (“The Science of Economics”).
Now that account undoubtedly has a heavy idealistic flair (again recalling idealism does not mean optimism here but causality via consciousness). As per Daniel Anderson's writings, one can reject idealism wholesale in favor of materialism. As such, one would therefore (like Daniel has) criticize Wilber's narrative philosophical reconstruction on historical materialist grounds against Wilber's more idealistic position. I'm not a historical materialist, but I appreciate the consistency of that criticism nonetheless.
In contrast I find the notion of Michael's critique of Wilber's view as having a teleological necessity to be ultimately unfair to Wilber's actual work, as shown above. Again one may not accept his presuppositions of levels, the quadrants (especially including consciousness as a fundamental dimension of existence), but contingency is radically built into his philosophy. Most especially so in his (so-called Wilber-5), post-metaphysical work.
I can see how one might gain the impression of a teleological necessity from initial reads of works like Sex, Ecology, and Spirituality, Up From Eden (minus the second edition foreward) and the like, but I don't see how a thinker like Wilber who argues so passionately for Creativity as a fundamental ontological existent is arguing for any teleological necessity. Wilber’s entire criticism of thinkers like Plontinus, Hegel, and Aurobindo especially depends on his idea that the future is not set.
Michael mentioned global capitalism specifically. Within Wilber’s terminology, global capitalism is the prime material expression of the "mean orange meme" or "flatland." Though I find neither of those terms from Wilber very helpful, I agree with the basic sentiment of a sickness to modernity (as well as some great advances). I hope I'm not belaboring the point, but one could disagree with Wilber's formulation of the sickness of modernity (or its historical causes) and yet still grant that he does radically understand the nature of contingency and therefore there is sufficient room for the criticism of global capitalism in his philosophy. This criticism may not yet have been fully brought forth (either by Ken himself or by related thinkers), but that does not mean there is any seemingly inability of Wilber's theory to deal with the contingent nature of social function. I would agree that this element of his theory has not been highlighted sufficiently or worked out in all its possible forms, but I simply do not think Michael is right to say the theory cannot adequately address this crucial issue.
I find applying Wilber’s principles 1-5 in relation to global capitalism very revealing.
Global capitalism has differentiated from agricultural forms of economic production. In fact, in financial economics, it has even differentiated (and further dissociated) from industrial capitalism. However capitalism has not come to integrate back to the earlier forms of life, leading to a massive dissociation (principle #2). This dissociation is reaping horrific outcomes due to this dissociation and inability to found economics in a notion of the Good Life via the truth procedure of Morals (e.g. the crushing poverty of billions on the planet).
Global capitalism has largely repressed and not included the earlier forms of life on this planet, upon which human society depends, e.g. oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico (Principle #3).
Global capitalism through various “structural readjustments” and “interventions” via organs like the IMF, World Bank, has formed itself into a dominator hierarchy as opposed to a more holacratic form of global economics (principle #4).
Beings all over the world in all various value modes use global capitalism as a “neutral” technological-economic platform to achieve their ends. Most disturbingly, the internet and global trade routes have allowed for the explosion of black markets in human trafficking and weapons. Terrorism worldwide is heavily financed through the sale of illegal narcotics (principle #5).
Given my response to the comment I've focused on the negative sides of global capitalism, but for the contrary case of the good news/positives of capitalism, see here.
In sum, it is absolutely true that Wilber has emphasized the failure of modernity more along philosophical and spiritual lines than in terms of the patterns of global capitalism, but all the tools necessary to make that criticism are there (if still more in potentia stage) right within the heart of Wilber's philosophy. He hasn't brought forth all the ramifications of his own philosophy (which for one person would be probably impossible anyway), but just because it hasn't been perhaps as emphasized as it should is not the same as saying the theory within its own framework is unable to address an issue. Or so I argue anyway.
…
There’s a great deal more that could be said on this topic, but I’ve already said quite enough. I’ll only mention one other key theoretical construct of Wilber’s of direct importance to concerns/criticisms regarding power, global capital, and contingent social formation: his understanding of the relation of techno-economic structures to consciousness.
Wilber argues that the techno-economic structure of a society is the largest single determinant in the average mode of consciousness.
That definition is very carefully parsed. The techno-economic structure is the largest determiner (not the only one) of the average mode of consciousness (i.e. this definition does not necessarily apply to individuals/groups expressing post-average modes of consciousness development).*
If one holds (as does Wilber per the above) to a serious sickness to global capitalism—the recognized dominant mode techno-economics on the planet—than the single greatest driver of the average level of consciousness development on the planet is sick. This dis-eased economic structure therefore means the average worldwide level of consciousness is in some ways sick.
Now to repeat once more, a person may not necessarily hold to Wilber’s structural stages/levels conception and/or of the inherent reality of consciousness—that would be an interesting debate to be had—but within the confines of Wilber’s philosophical system there is plenty of room for the kind of critique Michael would like to see.
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* In terms of level/stages it is important to remember Wilber argues that stages are 1. always reconstructed and not pre-determined 2. quasi-universal, not fully universal 3. probability waves of finding certain actions, thoughts, patterns not actually existing “things” out there 4. deep structures that are largely content-free and filled in by surface features (along the quadrants) which are radically culturally and linguistically constructed and our totally contingent.
